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Abstract
This paper analyzes the behavior of ﬁrms with defaulted credits in terms of
recovery or extinction. By deﬁning classes for the severity of default, survival models
for the multiple transitions from each class are estimated. The models are used to
simulate the evolution of a ﬁrm’s credit conditional on its characteristics. Estimates
for the expected recovery or extinction rates are constructed from these simulations.
They show that (i) the severity of default strongly inﬂuences the probability of
extinction; (ii) for less severe default episodes, recovery is faster than extinction,
and the opposite is true for more severe defaults; (iii) larger ﬁrms tend to display
better outcomes; (iv) and the number of employees is the single most important
determinant of the time proﬁle of the extinction/recovery process. Estimates of a
loss given default measure suggest that the supervision recommendations found in
the literature are appropriate.
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11 Introduction
The assessment of credit risk taking by ﬁnancial intermediaries evolved rapidly over the
last two decades. The continuous improvement in the capacity to process information
permitted major qualitative steps in the late 1990’s. An example is the estimation of the
ex ante propensity of ﬁrms to default, which became an alternative to the passive wait
for the material observation of the default of each particular borrower.
The New Basel Accord (Basel II) set out by the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (2004) incorporates the ex ante nature of credit risk, while requiring an interaction
between capital adequacy rules and provisioning requirements. Speciﬁc provision require-
ments remain very diverse across countries and in most jurisdictions are likely not to
coincide with the notion of “impairment adjustment” as set out in the IAS/IFRS.
Using information on credit for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, as well as information concerning
the type of ﬁrm, this paper proposes a method for measuring the long-run propensity of
companies to remain in default, once it was objectively observed, or to evolve either to
recovery or to deﬁnitive delinquency.
Beyond more sophisticated measures of loan losses, the model allows for the estimation
of recovery and/or loss given default rates. Both measures are relevant for impairment
assessment under IAS, calibration of provisioning rules, and capital adequacy assessment
under the advanced version of the Basel II Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) method.
Due to the inherently private nature of credit exposures, there is not much published
work with precise estimates of measures such as the probability of extinction or recovery
of ﬁrms once a default episode has been recorded. The Internal Ratings-Based approach
of the Basel Accord for banking supervision uses precisely this concept when deﬁning loss
given default (LGD) as the expected loss on a speciﬁc loan once default has occurred.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) outlines diﬀerent LGD calculation
methods for a large array of exposures. The existence of collateral is explicitly acknowl-
edged as an important mitigating factor on LGD estimates. Other factors include the
type of exposure (corporate, retail, ﬁnancial institutions) and maturity of loans, for in-
stance. In the context of ﬁnancial supervision, LGD may be calculated using the lender’s
2internal methods (the “advanced” approach of the IRB method), or taken oﬀ-the-shelf for
the purpose at hand (the “foundation” approach). In this case, the recommended value
for the most common exposures is 50 percent. In our case, probabilities are calculated
conditional on the state of the loan and other variables that characterize the ﬁrm. To
obtain an LGD comparable to the values found in the supervision literature, we have to
integrate across state distributions of the ﬁrst occurrence of default, conditional on the
ﬁrms’ characteristics.
Beyond long-run measures such as the one reported by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision, little is known about the time pattern of extinction and recovery of the
ﬁrms. For instance, given that a ﬁrm is going to become extinct, when is that going to
happen? Does recovery occur faster than extinction or is it the other way around? The
answers to these and other questions are important in that they allow for a proper justi-
ﬁcation of the postponement or anticipation of speciﬁc provisions, for instance, and also
because they allow a proper monitoring of the evolution of ﬁrms with a default record. If,
for instance, we know that a particular type of ﬁrm typically becomes extinct relatively
fast and recovers relatively slowly, one could view a long survival time as an indication
that the ﬁrm is going to survive with a high probability. To answer this kind of questions,
duration analysis presents obvious advantages over other possible approaches to this type
of problem, such as probit estimates.
We use duration analysis with competing risks to assess the survival of ﬁrms in a
given state. States are deﬁned primarily in terms of the severity of the credit default
episode. This is measured as the ratio between the amount of on-sheet overdue credit
of a ﬁrm, and the total amount of on-sheet outstanding credit. Based on estimates of
proportional hazard models for each state (where each competing risk is the transition to
failure, recovery, or another state), implied probabilities for a semi-Markov process are
calculated. We then simulate trajectories of credit history for a large number of ﬁrms and
estimate probabilities of extinction and recovery conditional on the length of the observed
credit episode and other characteristics of the ﬁrms. Standard errors for these estimates
are calculated by performing multiple experiments, where the semi-Markov transition
3probabilities are calculated from realizations of the parameter vector that respect the
distribution of the proportional hazard models estimated parameters.
The data come from two sources, the Central de Responsabilidades de Cr´ edito (CRC)
database, and an internal comprehensive database used for statistical purposes at Banco
de Portugal. The CRC comprises monthly credit information on non ﬁnancial, private
ﬁrms reported to the Portuguese central bank. Reporting is mandatory. Only ﬁrms that
have had a non-repayment episode are considered in the analysis. The internal statistical
purpose database has yearly information on the ﬁrm’s number of employees, sales, activity
sector, and region. Both databases virtually represent the respective universe and their
intersection spans the period from January 1995 to December 2000. In order to avoid
misreported or absent data from the CRC, we use end-of-the-period, quarterly data.
The estimation and simulation procedures enable us to compute probabilities and
other quantitative measures of the ﬁrms’ recovery or extinction processes. We assess the
severity of default using the ratio of due credit to total outstanding credit. We shall
call this measure the “default ratio”. The ﬁrst broad conclusion is that the severity
of default strongly and signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the probability of extinction. For the
least severe default episodes (the ones with a default ratio between 10 and 25 percent),
recovery is faster than extinction, and the opposite is true for more severe cases. The
simulations also suggest that larger ﬁrms tend to display better outcomes, and that the
number of employees is the single most important determinant of the time proﬁle of the
extinction/recovery process. Estimates of a loss given default measure suggest that the
supervision recommendations found in the literature are appropriate.
The characterization of deliquescent ﬁrms presented in this paper suﬀers from several
shortcomings. The ﬁrst is that credit data speciﬁc to each ﬁrm is aggregated across
ﬁnancial institutions. It is therefore impossible to distinguish between diﬀerent loans of
the same ﬁrm. This is unfortunate because loss given default estimates for supervisory
purposes should, in principle, distinguish between types of credit and maturity. Moreover,
the existence of collateral is not reported.
As for the estimation and the simulation strategies used, it is clear that the hypothesis
4of independence between the ﬁrm’s history in the state space prior to entry in current
state, and its duration of stay in the current state, merits some thoughts. However, the fact
that we used four intermediate states mitigates this concern, as dependence across spells
in diﬀerent states is likely to be smaller if states are not too dissimilar. If, for instance,
we deﬁned a continuum of states, then we would end up with a perfect description of the
underlying statistical process, should one exist.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation and
simulation strategies. Section 3 describes the data used for estimation purposes. Section
4 presents the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling transitions
2.1 Deﬁnition of states
Based primarily on the severity of the credit default episode r for a given ﬁrm in a known
moment, we deﬁne J states. The severity of the credit episode is calculated as the ratio
of on-sheet overdue credit, x, to the total amount of outstanding credit d.
There are two absorbing states in our analysis. A state is absorbing if a ﬁrm stays there
forever once it enters that state. The two states correspond to extinction and recovery.
A ﬁrm is deﬁned as extinct if r exceeds 90 percent and the amount of overdue credit is
higher than 100 euros. Recovery occurs whenever r is lower than 10 percent or d is smaller
than 100 euros. Sensitivity analysis for these thresholds will be provided in appendix A.
We deﬁne four non absorbing states. Provided d is higher than 100 euros, we use
thresholds for r of 25, 50 and 75 percent. Table 1 summarizes the deﬁnitions of states.
The motivation for deﬁnition of extinction comes from the fact that ﬁrms often stay in
a database such as the CRC long after they became eﬀectively bankrupt, or at least in a
situation where claims on outstanding debt are already fully provisioned. An alternative
criterion for ﬁrm extinction would lie, for instance, in the use of databases with information
on ﬁrms that were declared to have ended legal activity. This kind of database exists in
many countries. In the Portuguese case, however, the information is updated at a much
5lower frequency than the CRC, and often with a considerable lag.
It is worth noting that the fact that recovery is an absorbing state in the statistical
analysis does not imply that, for instance, a real world ﬁrm recovering from a bad credit
episode will never default again. We assume that once a ﬁrm recovers, the probability
that it again enters the pool of ﬁnancially stressed ﬁrms is statistically not diﬀerent from
that of any other ﬁrm with the same characteristics.
The fact that many ﬁrms simply disappear from the CRC database, and therefore
cannot be labelled as “extinct” or “recovered”, means in practical terms that these obser-
vations are censored. The mere observation that they were present in the CRC for some
period is taken into account in the parameter estimation, even though the destination
state is not observed.
Another observation is that diﬀerent deﬁnitions of recovery or extinction could have
been used in this analysis. For instance, one might have considered that a ﬁrm was
basically bankrupt from the moment when some bank wrote oﬀ its liabilities. This may
be seen as an indication of deﬁnitive non-recoverability of overdue claims. However, the
correlation between an indicator of the existence of write-oﬀs above the 100 euros and
the ﬁrst occurrence of the recovery state is only -8.5 percent. (The correlation with the
indicator of extinction is the same but positive.) This amounts to saying that many ﬁrms
that essentially have a small amount of overdue credit experience write-oﬀs.
The assumption that extinction is absorbing is acceptable because it implies that the
extinction probability calculated in this paper is an upper bound for its real counterpart.
As for the recovery rate, its deﬁnition is suﬃciently conservative to make sure that no
signiﬁcant impact on the bank’s balance sheet occurs for a threshold lower than 10 percent.
See appendix A for more details on this.
The thresholds chosen for r are motivated by the accounting rules of many countries,
which establish diﬀerent provisioning procedures based on r being less (or more) than 25
percent, 50 percent, or 75 percent.
6State number State label Conditioning event
1 “Recovery” r ≤ 0.1 or x ≤ 100
2 “Extinction” r ≥ 0.9 and x > 100
3 0.1 < r < 0.25 and x > 100
4 0.25 ≤ r < 0.5 and x > 100
5 0.5 ≤ r < 0.75 and x > 100
6 0.75 ≤ r < 0.9 and x > 100
Table 1: Deﬁnition of states. Amount of defaulted credit x in euros, r in natural units.
2.2 Duration models
We assume that the current state and the ﬁrm’s vector of characteristics, as well as the
duration of the ﬁrm’s stay in that state, determine the probability of transition to another
state per unit of time. For expositional purposes, suppose for now that there are only
two states, the origin and the destination states, and that all ﬁrms are equal. Deﬁne
T as the random variable describing the moment when the transition occurs. Assuming
that the ﬁrm enters the origin state at time 0, T is the duration of the ﬁrm’s stay in
the origin state. Deﬁne P(t ≤ T < t + dt|T ≥ t) as the probability that a transition to
the destination state occurs between instants t and t + dt, given that the ﬁrm survived
in the origin state up to moment t. The hazard function associated with the probability
measure P is deﬁned as
h(t) = lim
dt→0
P(t ≤ T < t + dt|T ≥ t)
dt
.
If there is a large number of ﬁrms, h(t) is, among all the ﬁrms that have not transited to
the destination state by moment t, the fraction of those transiting between t and t + dt.
Also of interest is the survival function. It is deﬁned as the fraction of ﬁrms that have not









From the deﬁnitions of the hazard and survival functions, it is easily seen that the prob-
ability density function of random variable T is f(t) = h(t)F(t).
The classical approach outlined in the previous paragraphs cannot be used in the
7context of multiple states and transitions. A ﬁrm is allowed to transit to a series of states
before recovering or becoming extinct. If a given ﬁrm is in, say, state i, then it will stay
in that state for a while, and eventually jump to state k 6= i. Since we do not know ex
ante to which state will the ﬁrm jump to, we say that there are competing risks: when
it occurs, the transition will be to one of the diﬀerent possible destination states. Since
we have J states, there are J − 1 diﬀerent hazard functions associated to state i, hik(t),
with k 6= i. As there are competing risks, the interpretation of function hik is tricky: it
is the probability per unit of time of transition to state k given that the ﬁrm has been in
state i for t units of time. Each of these functions has an associated random variable Tik.





the associated random variable is Ti = mink6=i{Tik}. This is the sense in which we say
that we are in the presence of competing risks. A survival function F i(t) associated to
this hazard function is calculated similarly to expression (1).
From a computational point of view, it is useful to transform survival models into
a semi-Markov process that can be used to simulate the underlying dynamics of state
transitions. A semi-Markov process is identical to a regular Markov chain except that the
transition probabilities depend on the elapsed time in the current state. The departure
from state i of a ﬁrm is characterized along two dimensions: (i) when does it occur; and
(ii) to which state does the ﬁrm go.
The ﬁrst dimension is governed by the probability density function fi(t). The prob-
ability density function of random variable Ti is simply fi(t) = hi(t)F i(t), where hi(t) is
given by equation (2) and F i(t) is obtained using expression (1) with index i in h and F.
The second dimension is determined by the probability that the transition, when it





8To characterize the dynamics of ﬁrms across states we have to estimate hazard functions
for every possible transition, then obtain overall hazard and survivor functions speciﬁc to
the current state, and ﬁnally compute ex ante probabilities for every possible transition.
Now suppose that each ﬁrm is described by a vector x of characteristics. For simplicity,
assume again that there are only two states: an origin and a destination state. The
proportional hazards hypothesis states that the conditional hazard function of a ﬁrm is
proportional to a baseline function that is valid for the entire population,
h(t|x) = e
xβh(t),
where β is a vector of parameters. From an estimation viewpoint, several functional
forms for h(t) have been used in the literature. Lancaster (1992) provides an analytic
treatment of several of those functions. Here we shall use a parametric approach based







There are essentially two reasons for this choice. First, the Weibull function is ﬂexible
enough to allow for increasing as well as decreasing hazards. Second, we want to simulate
the evolution of the credit of ﬁrms in order to compute recovery and extinction probabil-
ities. The adoption of a non-parametric hazard would limit us to the longest spell of a
ﬁrm in the state transition under study. This would require additional hypotheses about
the posterior behavior of the hazard.
For the estimation of the proportional hazards models, we only consider the ﬁrst
episode of each ﬁrm in each state. Successive jumps from one state to another are thus
eliminated as this might bias the results towards too much high-frequency dynamics, and
also to accommodate the hypothesis that two of the states are absorbing.
92.3 Simulation of ﬁrms’ behavior
To calculate the transition probabilities of the semi-Markov process that will be used
to simulate the credit evolution of a large number of ﬁrms, we ﬁrst need to estimate
conditional hazards hik(t|x), where i is an index of a non absorbing state, and k an
index of any state. We then use the (J − 2)(J − 1) functions to generate the transition
probabilities conditional on x, πik(x), and, for every non absorbing state, the probability
density function of departure time, fi(t|x). Finally, we simulate the evolution of 100
identical ﬁrms across states and compute the overall probability of extinction (or recovery)
conditional on the characteristics of the ﬁrm x and survival to time t. We shall call this
overall extinction probability πi(t,x). Naturally, a lot more information can be extracted
from these simulations.
To calculate the standard deviation of these estimates, this procedure is then repeated
1000 times for diﬀerent parameter draws from a distribution that respects the variance
matrix of the estimated parameters. A total of 100000 trajectories is therefore used.
3 The data
The ﬁrst data source used was the Central de Responsabilidades de Cr´ edito database. Por-
tuguese banks and other ﬁnancial institutions are required to report credit information
on an individual basis to the Portuguese central bank, which is gathered in the Central de
Responsabilidades de Cr´ edito (CRC) database. This information is centralized monthly
and is used by the participating ﬁnancial institutions to assess the risk proﬁle of current
or potential borrowers. The reported information is the total amount of credit for each
ﬁrm disaggregated by credit type. The credit type characterizes the loan and its repay-
ment status (see table 2). To study stressed ﬁrms, one resorts to delinquency situations,
including restructured loans and legally enforceable written oﬀ loans, which correspond
to credit types 7, 8, 9 and 10.
The available data is the complete credit history of each non-ﬁnancial corporation for
which at least one record of overdue or written oﬀ loans exists between 1995 and 2001,
10Credit type Description
1 Commercial liabilities
2 Financing liabilities at discount
3 Other short-term ﬁnancing liabilities
4 Medium- and long-term ﬁnancing liabilities
5 Other liabilities
6 Oﬀ-sheet liabilities
7 Overdue credit liabilities
8 Credit liabilities under litigation
9 Credit write-oﬀs
10 Renegotiated credits
Table 2: Credit types, Banco de Portugal.
starting from the date of the ﬁrst record. Each bad credit episode must be qualiﬁed by
its severity. This is deﬁned as the portion of on-balance sheet outstanding credit that is
overdue.
We exclude write-oﬀs from the severity measure. If the total liabilities of a ﬁrm
are write-oﬀs, then the ﬁrm is basically in the absorbing state labelled “extinction” and
no analysis is performed over that ﬁrm. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the
available data. There are 85322 ﬁrms in the database, which generate 1824695 monthly
observations. The average total credit is around 421 thousand euros. Bad credit is, on
average, roughly 150 thousand euros, that is, just above one third of total credit.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Regular credit 264.1 5359.7
Overdue credit liabilities 40.6 374.1
Credit liabilities under litigation 65.4 405.5
Renegotiated credits 0.1 9.3
Total 421.8 5474.8
Obs. 1824695
Months in database 29.258 30.347
Firms 85322
Table 3: Summary statistics, CRC database, monthly data, 1995–2001. Figures for credit type
in thousands of euros. Source: Banco de Portugal.
The second data source is an internal database used for statistical purposes at Banco
de Portugal. It contains information on every ﬁrm registered in Portugal with at least one
paid employee. It is updated every year with information on the activity sector, yearly
sales, number of employees, and location.The available data covers the period from 1995
to 2000. See table 4 for summary statistics on some of the variables available in this
11database. There are 430830 ﬁrms in the database and a total of 1345178 observations.
The average number of employees per ﬁrm is roughly 12.





Years in database 2.2 2
Firms 430830
Table 4: Summary statistics, internal database, yearly data, 1995–2000. Money ﬁgures in
thousands of euros.
The two databases have quite disjoint universes. The CRC has only ﬁrms that have
had at least one credit episode (as deﬁned above) in period 1995–2001, including those
that have no employees. Most of these ﬁrms are run by a single entrepreneur who is
not registered as an employee. The internal database has only ﬁrms with at least one
employee, regardless of the ﬁrms’ credit history. Moreover, the available internal data
ends by 2000, whereas the CRC ends in 2001.
As a consequence of the disjoint data sets, the number of overlapping ﬁrms is 34980
(with a total of 324136 monthly observations), which is just above one third of the ﬁrms
in the CRC, and less than 10 percent of the ﬁrms in the internal database. We can thus
estimate that around two thirds of ﬁrms with a delinquency episode have no employees,
and more than 90 percent of ﬁrms with at least one employee had no bad credit episodes
during the period under analysis.
4 Empirical results
The model hik(t|x) underlying each state transition was estimated using standard max-
imum likelihood maximization. The vector of covariates contains variables related to
credit, sales, number of employees, activity sector, location of the headquarters, and year
ﬁrst in current state. Table 6 in appendix B presents the estimations of the 20 models
needed to perform the simulations. The global test on the proportional hazards hypoth-
esis was not rejected in all but two regressions (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994). This
suggests that the proportional hazards hypothesis is a reasonable one in this application.
12Notice that many of the variables lack signiﬁcance in the regressions. This uncertainty of
estimation is taken into account through the variance matrix of the associated coeﬃcients.
Concerning the results of regressions, a few aspects are worth pointing out. First, ﬁrms
with larger loans are less likely to become extinct than smaller ones. This behavior is in
many instances statistically signiﬁcant and does not depend on the original default ratio.
Second, in 2000 transitions to extinction are less likely to occur relative to previous years.
There are other signiﬁcant variables for the diﬀerent transitions, but general patterns are
relatively diﬃcult to obtain. This might be related to the fact that a lot of observations
with spells started in 2000 are censored.
4.1 Probability of extinction and recovery
In the context of this model, only two long-run outcomes may occur: extinction or re-
covery. In order to compute the probability of extinction (and the associated total loss)
of a ﬁrm, we used the duration models described above to calculate a random set of tra-
jectories. By “extinction” we mean a transition of the default ratio to 0.1 or lower from
above. (We only consider observations for which the total defaulted amount is higher than
100 euros.) Using this deﬁnition, we computed probabilities of extinction and recovery
conditional of the ﬁrm’s covariates, state, and duration of stay in the current state. We
then repeated this procedure for diﬀerent random draws of the model parameters. We
were thus able to calculate both the probabilities and the conﬁdence interval associated
to the uncertainty in the estimation of parameters.
Figure 1 presents extinction probabilities conditional on the current state (deﬁned
in terms of r), and on the duration of stay in the current state. We are using the
baseline hazard functions, which means that all covariates are zero. As expected, the
probability of extinction increases as r increases. For instance, the ex ante probability
of extinction of a ﬁrm in state 3 (with r between 10 and 25 percent) at the end of the
ﬁrst quarter is 34 percent. At the end of the fourth quarter in state 3, that probability
is 38 percent. It should be noted that the semi-Markov process is memoryless regarding
previous transitions, that is, the transition probabilities to other states depend only on
13the covariates and the duration of stay in the current state. It does not depend on the
history of the ﬁrm it terms of states visited. This means that if after 3 months in state 3
a ﬁrm jumps to state 4, the extinction probability becomes 48 percent at the end of the
ﬁrst quarter in state 4, and not 53 percent, which is the extinction probability of a ﬁrm
at the end of the ﬁfth quarter in state 4.






































0.1 < r < 0.25
0.25 ≤ r < 0.5
0.5 ≤ r < 0.75
0.75 ≤ r < 0.9
Figure 1: Median extinction probabilities for diﬀerent states in terms of r, the default ratio.
Results using 100 simulated ﬁrms per each of 1000 parameter draws.
Another interesting feature of the data is that, as long as r ≤ 0.75, the probability
of extinction is only mildly increasing in the duration of stay in the current state. This
implies that the semi-Markov setting we used could be substituted by a pure Markov
chain, for which transition probabilities are constant. A fully memoryless chain thus
seems to be a reasonable ﬁrst approximation of the evolution of ﬁrms in terms of the
default ratio.
One might also be interested on the average duration of stay in a given state, and also
on the survival time to extinction and recovery. The number of ﬁrms in any given state
decays sharply over time. Figure 2 documents this aspect of the simulations. It can be
observed that the probability that a ﬁrm is still in state 3 after 6 quarters is less than 1
14percent. It should be noted, however, that not all the transitions from a non-absorbing
state have the two absorbing states as destination.




















































0.1 < r < 0.25
0.25 ≤ r < 0.5
0.5 ≤ r < 0.75
0.75 ≤ r < 0.9
Figure 2: Fraction of ﬁrms still in the original state. The results are obtained simulating
100000 ﬁrms for each initial state.
It is therefore useful to characterize the intertemporal proﬁle of extinction and recovery
conditional on the initial state, but unconditional on the subsequent trajectory of the ﬁrm
in the state space. Figure 3 presents the fraction of ﬁrms that either are extinct or
have recovered, irrespective of their subsequent trajectory in terms of the state space,
conditional on the event that at time zero they enter one of the non-absorbing states.1
We see that almost all transitions to one of the absorbing states have occurred by the
fourth year after default. An interesting feature of these graphs is that recovery is much
faster than extinction for the least severe episodes, and the opposite is true for the most
severe episodes. For instance, half of the ﬁrms initially in state 3 that will recover do it
during the ﬁrst three quarters; this ﬁgure is over two years for ﬁrms that are bound to
1The fact that the ﬁrm enters state i at time zero does not mean that the default occurs at time zero,
but rather that either the ﬁrm was previously in another non-absorbing state, or it had not defaulted yet.
This is a consequence of the assumption that the behavior of a ﬁrm after it enters a non-absorbing state
does not depend on its previous history in the state space; it only depends on the ﬁrm’s length of stay
in the current state and on its current covariates. For this reason, we shall often identify the moment a
ﬁrm enters one of the non-absorbing states as the moment it defaults.
15become extinct.
This graph also documents an important aspect of the debate on loss given default
(LGD), a measure used in ﬁnancial supervision practices. The fact that the speed of
recovery and/or extinction depends on the severity of the default episode means that
such measure should be calculated over a suﬃciently large time span. In most cases, two
years seem to be a reasonable time span for the uncertainty in terms of extinction or
recovery to be revealed. Table 5 presents the fraction of ﬁrms that transited to one of
the absorbing states for diﬀerent time lengths, along with the split between recovery and
extinction, conditional on the event that at time zero they enter one of the non-absorbing
states. For instance, we see that the fate of a ﬁrm that at time zero entered state 3 (with
0.1 < r < 0.25) is known with a probability of 48 percent after one year of entering that
state. (As in ﬁgure 3, this probability is not conditional on the ﬁrm staying in the same
state until transition to recovery or extinction occurs.) At the end of the second year, the
probability that the ﬁnal outcome has unravelled is 71 percent. In both cases, recovery is
the most likely destination, although less so in the second year.
The calculation of a general purpose LGD involves the integration of probabilities such
as the ones presented in table 5 across all ﬁrms that historically have defaulted, conditional
on the ﬁrms characteristics. This measure would then be the average loss given default.
This general purpose value is, in the “foundation” of the IRB method, 50 percent. A
rough estimate of a similar value for the data in this work implies an LGD of 46 percent.2
This value seems to support the IRB foundation approach recommendations, but more
accurate values may be easily obtained using the historical distributions of particular loan
portfolios.
However, care must be used when assessing these values. First, data correspond
to a particular time period and to a particular country. Second, the more sophisticated
“advanced” approach encourages a more targeted estimation of LGD, and this is precisely
what this model mainly does.
2This estimate was obtained using the relative frequencies of the ﬁrst visit to each state found in the
data and the asymptotic values of LGD measures reported in table 5. This value should be viewed as an
upper bound because it uses the baseline hazard functions (with all covariates equal to zero) and larger
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Figure 3: Fraction of ﬁrms that recovered or became extinct given initial state. The results
are obtained simulating 100000 ﬁrms for each initial state.
These results suggest that loss given default calculated over a one year interval, for
instance, is likely to be a short-sighted measure, as a lot of uncertainty regarding recovery
or extinction unravels during the second and third years. Table 5 reports upper bounds
for expected loss given default (LGD) conditional on the initial state, calculated as the
probability of extinction times 100 percent of loss plus the probability of recovery times
10 percent of loss (the lower bound of state 3). Let us focus on state 3, which corresponds
to the default ratio lying between 10 and 25 percent. Suppose a ﬁrm that at time zero
defaults and enters state 3. The model estimates that there is a probability of 45 percent
that it recovers in the ensuing year. Conversely, it has a probability of extinction in that
period of 3 percent. Therefore, one would expect that, on average, no less than 8 percent
of total outstanding loans would be lost in a one-year horizon. However, as previously
remarked, during the ﬁrst year many ﬁrms recover and a relatively lower number of ﬁrms
go bankrupt. This implies that at time zero the expected loss during the second year
given that the ﬁnal fate of the ﬁrm has not yet been resolved by then is 32 percent of
18outstanding loans.3 The second year is much more critical in terms of losses than the
ﬁrst one. A reasonable value for the expected loss horizon is three years: by the end of
the third year of the episode, conditional on initial state 3, the expected three-year loss
is over 80 percent its value in the inﬁnite horizon, and much more than that for the other
initial states.
From a ﬁnancial supervision viewpoint, it may be preferable to update expected losses
and other measures of ﬁrm creditworthiness as time unfolds. This can be done by con-
ditioning these measures to the event that the ﬁrm has stayed in the current state for a
given number of quarters, and to the covariates of the ﬁrm. Changing covariates will be
the subject of the next section. As for the duration of stay in the current state, ﬁgure
4 shows the same type of probability as ﬁgure 3 but conditional on the event that the
ﬁrm is in a particular non-absorbing state at the end of the ﬁrst year since entering that
state. Recall the previous observation that the semi-Markov process that we used could
in a ﬁrst approximation be substituted by a simple Markov chain, that is, a process where
the likelihood of transition does not depend on the duration of stay in the current state.
Consistent with that, ﬁgure 4 is not fundamentally diﬀerent from ﬁgure 3, except that
uncertainty regarding the ultimate fate of ﬁrms is revealed earlier. For instance, from the
tenth quarter on all probabilities have attained their asymptotic values; this compares
with at least 16 quarters in the previous case. This feature is relevant for estimation of
the expected loss of ﬁrms whose history in the current state is known and for which up-
dates are performed regularly. Since for those ﬁrms uncertainty unravels faster, estimates
of their expected losses are likely to be more accurate.
4.2 Heterogeneity of ﬁrms
Up to this point, we used the so called “baseline hazards” in the estimation of the transi-
tion probabilities and in-state survival times. This section explores another dimension of
the data: the information provided by the internal database.
3This ﬁgure may calculated from table 5: there is a 16 percent probability that the ﬁrm recovers
during the second year, and an 8 percent probability that it goes to extinction in that period. This
implies an LGD measure of 32 percent.
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Figure 4: Fraction of ﬁrms that recovered or became extinct given current state and the fact
that the ﬁrm entered the current state one year before. The results are obtained simulating
100000 ﬁrms for each initial state.
Recall from section 2 that the hazard function hik(t|x) is the probability density that
a ﬁrm goes from state i to state k 6= i at time t, conditional on the ﬁrm entering state i
at time 0, remaining there up to time t, and being characterized by a vector of covariates
x in that period. The proportional hazards hypothesis states that hik(t|x) = exβhik(t),
where hik(t) is the baseline hazard. Therefore, the previous calculations pertain to a ﬁrm
for which all covariates are zero. This means a ﬁrm without employees or sales, with
outstanding credits d between 104 and 105 euros, with a default episode beginning in
1995, located in the Lisbon region and operating in the commerce and services sector.
It is clear that the ﬁrst two ﬁgures are unrealistic; they could be substituted by, say, 10
employees and sales of 1 million euros without any qualitative diﬀerence in the results
hitherto reported.
To compare the impact of the diﬀerent covariates in the calculations of probabilities
of extinction and recovery, let us deﬁne one benchmark case in terms of the number
of employees and sales. We shall consider a ﬁrm with 20 employees and annual sales
20of 1 million euros.4 The other covariates are zero; the hazard functions used therefore
correspond to the omitted categories indicated above.
Perhaps one of the most relevant questions is knowing if the scale of the ﬁrm has an
impact on the recovery/extinction time proﬁle. Figure 5 presents the fraction of ﬁrms
that recover or become extinct conditional on the initial state. For the least severe cases,
extinction is quite slow and the asymptotic probability of extinction is much lower than
the reference case. Moreover, recovery is slower and more ﬁrms end up recovering than
in the reference case. For the most severe cases, the previous conclusions also hold:
uncertainty tends to unravel more slowly for larger ﬁrms, generally with a more benign
outcome.




































































































Figure 5: Fraction of ﬁrms that recovered or became extinct given initial state. Comparison
between the reference ﬁrm and an identical ﬁrm ten times as large as the reference ﬁrm. The
results are obtained simulating 100000 ﬁrms for each initial state.
To understand the determinants of the previous behavior, one might resort to the
assessment of the contribution of each of the three variables related to dimension in the
database: number of employees, sales and total outstanding loans. Let us ﬁrst compare
4The average number of employees and total sales with pooled data are 18.3 and 1.28 million euros,
respectively.
21the benchmark ﬁrm with an equal ﬁrm except that the number of employees is ten times as
large. Figure 6 shows the result of the exercise. The ﬁrst observation is that the outcome
is in general more favorable. For the least severe cases, we see that extinction displays
quite diﬀerent results, since now extinction is faster than the reference case. Recovery is
quite similar. For more severe cases, recovery shows a relatively comparable pattern, but
extinction is faster than the reference case. When we perform the same exercise for ﬁrms
with ten times the sales of the reference case (ﬁgure 7), we see almost identical patterns
for the least severe cases, and also a qualitatively similar pattern for the most severe
cases with more benign outcomes (lower probability of extinction; higher probability of
recovery). Figure 8 presents the case where outstanding loans are ten times as high as
the reference case. Again, a pattern quite similar to the reference case.
The previous observations suggest that the number of employees in an important
determinant of the time proﬁle of a troubled ﬁrm’s extinction/recovery process. Firms
with more employees tend to have more benign outcomes. For the most severe cases, the
recovery process tends to be slower, and the extinction process is faster. For the least
severe cases, extinction is faster but less likely, and recovery is basically more likely. These
facts corroborate a number of both empirical and theoretical studies stating that larger
ﬁrms (which tend to have larger sunk costs and speciﬁc capital) are more prone to survive
crisis than their smaller counterparts. For instance, Mata and Portugal (1994) ﬁnd that
the survival of new ﬁrms is positively related to a larger dimension in terms of the number
of employees.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the behavior of ﬁrms with defaulted credits in terms of recovery or
extinction. By deﬁning classes for the severity of default, survival models for the multiple
transitions from each class are estimated. The models are used to simulate the evolution
of a ﬁrm’s situation conditional on the ﬁrm’s characteristics. We show that the severity of
default strongly inﬂuences the probability of extinction; for less severe default episodes,
recovery is faster than extinction, and the opposite is true for more severe defaults; larger




































































































Figure 6: Fraction of ﬁrms that recovered or became extinct given initial state. Comparison
between the reference ﬁrm and another ﬁrm with ten times the reference ﬁrm’s employees. The
results are obtained simulating 100000 ﬁrms for each initial state.
ﬁrms tend to display better outcomes; and the number of employees is the single most
important determinant of the time proﬁle of the extinction/recovery process. Estimates of
loss given default corroborate the supervision recommendations regarding this measure.
Within the scope of feasible future improvements of this research, we would empha-
size the introduction of industry-wide and equity measures in the regressions. These
would control for intra-industry competition, relative performance of the industry, and
the impact of foreign ownership and capital structure on the ﬁrm performance.
Another improvement, unfortunately not feasible with current data, would be to disag-
gregate credit by credit institution and maturity. This would allow for a proper treatment
of the dynamics of a ﬁrm’s credit across ﬁnancial institutions. An additional piece of in-
teresting information would be the existence or not of collateral.




































































































Figure 7: Fraction of ﬁrms that recovered or became extinct given initial state. Comparison
between the reference ﬁrm and another ﬁrm with ten times the reference ﬁrm’s sales. The results
are obtained simulating 100000 ﬁrms for each initial state.
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Figure 8: Fraction of ﬁrms that recovered or became extinct given initial state. Comparison
between the reference ﬁrm and another ﬁrm with outstanding loans between 1000 and 10000
euros. The results are obtained simulating 100000 ﬁrms for each initial state.
Appendix A Sensitivity to thresholds
An important issue in this approach is the impact of the thresholds for the deﬁnition of
states, especially the absorbing ones, on the statistical signiﬁcance and accuracy of the
estimates. An extensive analysis was performed with respect to their deﬁnition. Here we
report the results for the most important threshold, the upper limit of the default ratio of
the absorbing state “recovery”, which was set at 10 percent. Figure 9 displays the median
extinction probabilities for states 3 and 6 conditional on the current state and the length of
stay in the current state. We see in panel (b) that setting a much more stringent threshold
(5 percent) yields qualitatively similar results, but the conﬁdence intervals at 90 percent
become a lot wider. This is due to the fact that for a more stringent threshold we end up
having much less transitions to recovery and any estimates are bound to become much
less accurate. This result suggests that using more stringent thresholds does not change
signiﬁcantly the median results, but does severely aﬀect their accuracy. As a consequence,
25the probability of extinction for state 6 is statistically higher at the 5 percent level than
that of state 3, for example.

































State: 0.1< r < 0.25







Quarters in the current state


























State: 0.75 ≤ r < 0.9

































State: 0.05 < r < 0.25







Quarters in the current state


























State: 0.75 ≤ r < 0.9
Figure 9: Median extinction probabilities for two states and two diﬀerent values of the lower
limit of r, with 90 percent conﬁdence intervals. Results using 100 simulated ﬁrms per each of
1000 parameter draws.
26Appendix B Regressions results
27(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(3 → 1) (3 → 2) (3 → 4) (3 → 5) (3 → 6) (4 → 1) (4 → 2)
Employees (102) -0.003 0.207 -0.327 -0.144 0.170 -0.046 -0.547
(0.03) (0.73) (2.16)* (0.34) (0.93) (0.20) (1.37)
Sales (106) -0.000 -0.214 0.009 -0.023 -0.006 -0.048 0.026
(0.05) (1.27) (2.62)** (0.33) (1.17) (1.00) (1.62)
102 ≤ d < 103 -0.486 1.780 0.420 0.104 -10.914 -0.327 1.661
(0.84) (3.79)** (0.97) (0.10) (40.33)** (0.78) (6.62)**
103 ≤ d < 104 -0.133 0.763 0.400 -0.006 -0.121 -0.347 1.191
(1.47) (4.83)** (4.65)** (0.03) (0.37) (2.37)* (8.89)**
105 ≤ d < 106 0.225 -0.772 -0.010 0.006 -0.186 0.032 -0.312
(3.13)** (3.47)** (0.12) (0.03) (0.76) (0.28) (1.85)
d ≥ 106 -0.185 -0.343 0.252 -0.143 -0.503 -0.207 -1.081
(1.20) (0.93) (1.61) (0.42) (1.11) (0.76) (2.37)*
Year 1996 0.021 0.410 -0.154 -0.317 -0.135 0.095 0.083
(0.20) (1.68) (1.29) (1.43) (0.39) (0.54) (0.43)
Year 1997 -0.140 0.505 0.033 0.037 0.041 0.148 0.278
(1.33) (2.07)* (0.30) (0.18) (0.12) (0.87) (1.51)
Year 1998 0.028 0.289 -0.094 -0.287 0.090 0.190 0.063
(0.26) (1.13) (0.80) (1.29) (0.27) (1.10) (0.32)
Year 1999 0.030 0.177 -0.100 -0.635 -0.590 0.204 -0.184
(0.29) (0.68) (0.87) (2.53)* (1.46) (1.17) (0.87)
Year 2000 -0.179 -0.326 -0.388 -0.515 -0.107 -0.094 -0.799
(1.50) (0.98) (2.78)** (1.86) (0.26) (0.44) (2.66)**
Primary activities 0.043 0.726 -0.048 -0.310 1.031 0.014 0.257
(0.24) (1.89) (0.20) (0.65) (2.09)* (0.06) (0.72)
Extraction and manufacturing -0.091 0.149 0.363 -0.202 1.144 0.123 -0.112
(0.70) (0.65) (2.83)** (0.81) (3.92)** (0.68) (0.48)
Wood, chemistry, machinery 0.175 -0.507 0.202 -0.348 0.203 0.072 0.271
(1.70) (1.87) (1.80) (1.44) (0.54) (0.47) (1.50)
Electric instruments -0.191 -0.008 -0.033 -0.444 -0.950 -0.309 -0.488
(1.00) (0.02) (0.18) (1.07) (0.92) (0.84) (1.11)
Utilities and construction 0.066 0.003 0.164 -0.111 0.354 0.030 0.335
(0.66) (0.01) (1.45) (0.51) (0.95) (0.18) (1.82)
Transportation 0.037 -0.453 0.125 -0.801 0.544 0.234 0.356
(0.26) (1.14) (0.81) (1.90) (1.19) (1.08) (1.43)
Services to ﬁrms and housing 0.151 -0.307 0.037 -0.326 -0.116 0.116 -0.019
(1.19) (1.05) (0.25) (1.16) (0.23) (0.61) (0.08)
Education and health care 0.100 0.388 0.224 -1.565 0.834 -0.107 0.145
(0.47) (0.98) (0.98) (1.55) (1.35) (0.31) (0.38)
Collective and social services -0.305 0.201 -0.337 0.353 -0.034 -0.018 0.160
(1.38) (0.53) (1.19) (1.00) (0.04) (0.06) (0.46)
North 0.170 0.167 0.059 0.213 -0.260 0.053 0.195
(2.18)* (0.99) (0.68) (1.33) (1.00) (0.44) (1.43)
Center 0.220 0.039 0.201 0.063 0.135 0.181 -0.171
(2.29)* (0.19) (1.97)* (0.31) (0.46) (1.31) (0.98)
Alentejo 0.038 -0.338 -0.391 -0.811 -0.218 -0.013 -0.195
(0.26) (0.93) (1.95) (1.73) (0.38) (0.05) (0.66)
Algarve 0.283 0.338 0.033 0.586 0.416 -0.177 -0.072
(1.79) (1.00) (0.17) (1.88) (0.91) (0.72) (0.28)
Constant -2.662 -4.608 -2.971 -3.942 -5.404 -3.205 -4.031
(26.95)** (19.35)** (28.14)** (19.41)** (16.43)** (18.65)** (20.82)**
Observations 10156 10156 10156 10156 10156 7422 7422
Subjects 7391.00 7391.00 7391.00 7391.00 7391.00 5127.00 5127.00
Transitions 1336.00 227.00 1027.00 234.00 91.00 510.00 348.00
α 1.80 1.93 1.94 1.84 1.96 1.62 1.87
Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimation results. Omitted categories are: outstanding loans d
between 104 and 105 euros; year of arrival to state 1995; commerce and services sector; Lisbon
region.
28(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(4 → 3) (4 → 5) (4 → 6) (5 → 1) (5 → 2) (5 → 3) (5 → 4)
Employees (102) 0.253 -0.173 -0.849 0.876 -0.455 -0.070 0.242
(1.31) (0.71) (1.44) (3.62)** (1.21) (0.16) (1.07)
Sales (106) -0.012 0.008 -0.008 -0.053 0.018 -0.003 -0.010
(1.19) (0.78) (0.20) (1.42) (1.21) (0.04) (1.16)
102 ≤ d < 103 -0.616 -0.213 0.875 0.176 1.312 -0.361 -15.075
(1.35) (0.56) (2.11)* (0.30) (5.29)** (0.50) (90.30)**
103 ≤ d < 104 -0.071 0.482 -0.261 -0.505 1.171 -0.551 0.029
(0.56) (4.48)** (1.02) (1.70) (9.59)** (1.85) (0.17)
105 ≤ d < 106 -0.278 -0.048 0.028 -0.106 -0.617 -0.365 -0.467
(2.40)* (0.42) (0.14) (0.54) (3.67)** (1.66) (2.90)**
d ≥ 106 -0.365 0.131 0.357 -1.264 -0.721 -0.668 -0.554
(1.60) (0.61) (0.83) (2.62)** (1.97)* (1.44) (1.68)
Year 1996 0.011 -0.051 0.217 -0.329 0.098 -0.121 -0.088
(0.07) (0.34) (0.85) (1.13) (0.53) (0.40) (0.43)
Year 1997 -0.199 0.015 -0.326 -0.114 0.073 -0.216 -0.128
(1.20) (0.10) (1.17) (0.41) (0.40) (0.70) (0.60)
Year 1998 -0.085 -0.219 -0.336 0.169 0.259 0.041 0.077
(0.51) (1.35) (1.15) (0.61) (1.43) (0.14) (0.38)
Year 1999 0.142 -0.019 -0.320 -0.370 0.395 -0.242 -0.163
(0.89) (0.12) (1.07) (1.18) (2.22)* (0.76) (0.75)
Year 2000 -0.281 -0.147 -0.330 -0.218 0.008 -0.207 -0.285
(1.40) (0.81) (0.92) (0.62) (0.04) (0.56) (1.07)
Primary activities 0.103 -0.820 -0.144 0.018 0.046 -0.267 0.247
(0.42) (2.31)* (0.32) (0.04) (0.13) (0.46) (0.64)
Extraction and manufacturing -0.207 0.094 -0.076 -0.304 0.280 -0.178 0.266
(1.13) (0.59) (0.25) (0.95) (1.45) (0.55) (1.29)
Wood, chemistry, machinery 0.036 -0.004 0.351 0.104 -0.146 -0.127 -0.151
(0.24) (0.03) (1.46) (0.38) (0.73) (0.42) (0.66)
Electric instruments -0.493 0.017 -0.317 -0.376 0.288 0.299 0.303
(1.27) (0.05) (0.56) (0.77) (1.07) (0.68) (0.91)
Utilities and construction 0.195 0.059 -0.334 0.013 0.103 0.076 0.203
(1.28) (0.41) (1.13) (0.05) (0.60) (0.27) (1.04)
Transportation 0.078 0.087 0.344 -0.495 0.172 -1.420 0.283
(0.36) (0.44) (0.99) (1.01) (0.78) (1.94) (1.01)
Services to ﬁrms and housing -0.067 0.001 -0.537 0.305 0.091 0.204 0.131
(0.35) (0.00) (1.34) (1.01) (0.41) (0.60) (0.49)
Education and health care 0.099 -0.193 -14.533 -0.680 0.479 -0.633 -0.135
(0.32) (0.62) (71.56)** (0.67) (1.52) (0.62) (0.23)
Collective and social services -0.005 0.009 -0.901 -0.066 0.890 -0.280 0.987
(0.02) (0.04) (1.20) (0.12) (3.65)** (0.39) (3.49)**
North -0.109 -0.053 -0.157 0.120 0.025 0.011 0.225
(0.96) (0.49) (0.82) (0.57) (0.19) (0.05) (1.45)
Center -0.082 0.064 -0.283 0.298 0.342 0.121 0.078
(0.60) (0.51) (1.13) (1.21) (2.42)* (0.45) (0.41)
Alentejo 0.146 -0.375 -1.119 -0.052 -0.352 0.698 0.740
(0.70) (1.64) (1.84) (0.10) (0.97) (1.72) (2.56)*
Algarve -0.658 -0.129 -0.500 0.264 0.143 -0.370 0.297
(2.39)* (0.63) (1.14) (0.79) (0.59) (0.78) (1.11)
Constant -2.851 -2.985 -3.831 -3.636 -3.338 -3.451 -3.128
(19.12)** (20.84)** (14.04)** (14.16)** (18.60)** (12.99)** (16.48)**
Observations 7422 7422 7422 4098 4098 4098 4098
Subjects 5127.00 5127.00 5127.00 2853.00 2853.00 2853.00 2853.00
Transitions 552.00 650.00 162.00 158.00 439.00 142.00 302.00
α 1.68 1.79 1.66 1.71 1.99 1.67 1.72
Table 6: Continued.
29(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(5 → 6) (6 → 1) (6 → 2) (6 → 3) (6 → 4) (6 → 5)
Employees (102) -0.224 -0.983 0.585 1.648 0.269 0.413
(0.76) (1.08) (1.93) (2.87)** (0.36) (1.03)
Sales (106) 0.009 0.038 -0.026 -0.084 -0.006 -0.069
(0.80) (1.05) (1.96) (1.29) (0.22) (0.88)
102 ≤ d < 103 -0.930 0.069 0.606 0.140 0.540 -13.342
(1.28) (0.09) (2.15)* (0.14) (0.67) (48.49)**
103 ≤ d < 104 0.454 -0.218 0.456 0.602 0.464 -0.054
(3.14)** (0.58) (3.61)** (1.47) (1.25) (0.21)
105 ≤ d < 106 -0.220 -0.302 -0.314 -1.689 -0.330 -0.066
(1.44) (1.02) (2.03)* (2.84)** (0.90) (0.30)
d ≥ 106 -0.066 -1.339 -0.814 -2.305 -0.437 -0.189
(0.24) (1.61) (2.78)** (2.17)* (0.81) (0.45)
Year 1996 -0.057 0.027 -0.393 0.246 0.613 -0.283
(0.30) (0.06) (2.16)* (0.27) (1.02) (0.99)
Year 1997 -0.228 0.304 0.038 1.206 0.720 -0.270
(1.18) (0.68) (0.24) (1.48) (1.17) (0.91)
Year 1998 -0.149 0.340 -0.216 1.090 1.089 -0.261
(0.74) (0.75) (1.21) (1.30) (1.88) (0.90)
Year 1999 0.021 0.005 -0.356 1.131 0.900 -0.442
(0.11) (0.01) (1.99)* (1.33) (1.53) (1.46)
Year 2000 -0.581 0.040 -0.615 1.317 -0.188 -1.258
(2.15)* (0.07) (2.57)* (1.49) (0.21) (2.31)*
Primary activities -1.172 -0.510 -0.116 1.719 0.482 -1.962
(1.81) (0.66) (0.38) (2.40)* (0.78) (1.92)
Extraction and manufacturing 0.323 -0.664 -0.312 -2.009 -1.069 0.057
(1.66) (1.20) (1.40) (2.50)* (1.58) (0.18)
Wood, chemistry, machinery 0.275 -0.053 -0.143 -0.723 0.478 0.342
(1.48) (0.12) (0.77) (0.88) (1.21) (1.30)
Electric instruments 0.640 -0.648 -0.475 -14.247 0.231 0.196
(2.26)* (0.89) (1.15) (25.55)** (0.39) (0.39)
Utilities and construction 0.212 0.172 -0.094 0.888 0.407 0.080
(1.12) (0.46) (0.49) (1.68) (1.02) (0.26)
Transportation -0.079 -0.284 0.044 -0.390 -0.304 0.142
(0.29) (0.44) (0.21) (0.37) (0.40) (0.35)
Services to ﬁrms and housing 0.164 -0.562 -0.244 0.747 -0.794 -0.339
(0.68) (1.04) (1.14) (1.35) (1.12) (0.80)
Education and health care -0.003 1.029 0.111 -13.554 0.363 -0.774
(0.01) (1.58) (0.35) (29.63)** (0.35) (0.74)
Collective and social services 0.114 0.505 -0.393 0.689 -13.553 0.669
(0.27) (0.81) (0.88) (0.58) (39.26)** (1.29)
North 0.141 0.269 0.028 0.778 0.115 -0.105
(0.99) (0.88) (0.21) (1.79) (0.35) (0.48)
Center 0.369 -0.002 -0.112 -0.076 -0.573 0.190
(2.31)* (0.01) (0.71) (0.12) (1.27) (0.74)
Alentejo 0.266 -13.704 -0.205 1.386 0.413 -0.251
(0.80) (29.61)** (0.57) (2.14)* (0.67) (0.40)
Algarve 0.049 0.832 -0.545 -0.848 -0.588 0.815
(0.16) (1.97)* (1.93) (0.73) (0.76) (2.55)*
Constant -3.130 -3.954 -1.824 -6.005 -4.742 -2.872
(18.63)** (9.04)** (11.77)** (6.84)** (8.02)** (10.76)**
Observations 4098 2238 2238 2238 2238 2238
Subjects 2853.00 1527.00 1527.00 1527.00 1527.00 1527.00
Transitions 370.00 75.00 454.00 33.00 62.00 151.00
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